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What Does “Assessment” Mean?  The Supreme 
Court’s Misinterpretation of the Tax 
Injunction Act and its Disregard for 
Principles of Comity in Hibbs v. Winn Leads 
to the Adjudication of State Tax Credit Issues 
in Federal Court 
Sean M. Stegmaier* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In our federalist society, constitutional jurisprudence and 
respect for the federalist principles on which our Constitution is 
based demand that state governments be granted deference to 
administer their own tax systems without unwarranted and 
unprovoked federal intrusion.1  Therefore, if a State has a 
legitimate interest in increasing attendance at its private and 
secondary schools, and chooses to offer to its taxpayers a tax 
credit in order to achieve this legitimate interest, the federal 
government should stay its hand and allow the State to arrange 
its fiscal affairs in whatever manner it deems necessary and 
appropriate.  Congress recognized the imperative need for the 
states to arrange their tax systems without unnecessary federal 
court interference when it enacted the Tax Injunction Act in 1937 
(TIA), which provides in its entirety as follows: “[t]he district 
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy 
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”2 
The statutory language of the TIA clearly indicates the 
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May 2006; B.A. Business Economics, B.A. Philosophy, University of California at Santa 
Barbara, June 2002.  I would like to thank the entire Chapman Law Review staff for their 
dedication and diligence in making publication of this Note possible.  I would also like to 
thank Professor Celestine McConville for her informative comments and insight.  I 
sincerely thank my family for their guidance, inspiration and encouragement.  Finally, 
and most importantly, I would like to thank Michelle for being my source of motivation 
and for always believing in me.  Without her, none if this would have been possible. 
 1 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 710 (3d ed. 1999). 
 2 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
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intent of Congress: as long as the respective State is able to 
provide an adequate State court remedy for any challenge to an 
aspect of the State’s tax system, federal district courts lack 
subject matter jurisdiction over so delicate an area as a State’s 
tax administration.  Furthermore, because the TIA “has its roots 
in equity practice, in principles of federalism, and in recognition 
of the imperative need of a State to administer its own fiscal 
operations,” federal courts, through congressional decree and 
longstanding principles of comity, are obligated to defer to and 
respect a State’s administration of its tax system.3  By allowing 
federal district courts to adjudicate challenges to state tax 
credits, despite the clear statutory bar imposed by the TIA, the 
Supreme Court in Hibbs v. Winn has effectively shown complete 
disregard for Congress’ intent in enacting the federalism-based 
statute, and has furthermore abandoned venerable principles of 
comity, which require federal courts to defer to the states in 
administering their respective tax systems.4 
Part II of this Note discusses the Arizona State tax credit 
offered in Arizona Revised Statute § 1089,5 and how the Arizona 
statute was first challenged in the Arizona Supreme Court by a 
group of Arizona taxpayers.  Part II goes on to discuss Hibbs v. 
Winn and the opinions of both the majority and the dissent.  Part 
III of this Note begins by addressing the inherent difficulties in 
accepting the Supreme Court’s holding and heavily relies on the 
arguments and reasoning set forth by the dissent.  Part III goes 
on to discuss the potentially hazardous consequences to state 
sovereignty stemming from the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Hibbs v. Winn, and how the Winn Court ignored the broad 
federalism underpinnings of the TIA. 
II.  HIBBS V. WINN—A STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The Arizona Tax Credit Goes to the Arizona Supreme Court 
In 1997, the Arizona Legislature enacted Arizona Revised 
Statute § 43-1089 (A.R.S. § 1089), which permits State tax 
credits for contributions made to “[s]chool tuition 
organization[s]”6 (STO) by Arizona taxpayers.7  The A.R.S. § 1089 
 
 3 Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 (1976). 
 4 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004). 
 5 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089 (2004). 
 6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(F)(3) provides the following: “‘[s]chool tuition 
organization’ means a charitable organization in this state that is exempt from federal 
taxation under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code and that allocates at least ninety 
per cent of its annual revenue for educational scholarships or tuition grants to children to 
allow them to attend any qualified school of their parents’ choice.  In addition, to qualify 
as a school tuition organization the charitable organization shall provide educational 
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tax credit allows an Arizona taxpayer a dollar-for-dollar tax 
credit for up to $500 per year for contributions made to STOs 
during the taxable year; married couples who file a joint return 
are permitted a tax credit of up to $625.8  The tax credit offered 
under A.R.S. § 1089 differs from tax deductions for contributions 
to nonprofit schools in that A.R.S. § 1089 offers a credit against 
total taxes owed, and does not merely reduce a taxpayer’s income 
that is subject to taxation.9  Furthermore, the tax credit can only 
be used to reduce a taxpayer’s total amount of taxes owed by the 
allowable amount (i.e., $500 maximum credit for a single 
individual or $625 for a married couple filing a joint return), and 
the taxpayer is not entitled to any type of tax refund based on the 
taxpayer’s contribution.10 
A.R.S. § 1089 imposes certain limitations and requirements 
on the manner in which STOs are to facilitate taxpayer 
contributions.  First, the tax credit is not allowed if the taxpayer 
designates the donation to the STO for the direct benefit of any 
dependent of the taxpayer.11  Second, the STOs are required to 
spend at least ninety percent of the contributions on educational 
scholarships and grants for children so that those children can 
attend private or secondary schools.12  Third, beneficiaries of the 
STO’s funds must be from at least two different schools.13  
Finally, an STO cannot distribute funds to students who attend 
schools that discriminate on the basis of race, color, handicap, 
familial status or national origin.14 
Approximately two years after the Arizona Legislature 
enacted A.R.S. § 1089, several Arizona taxpayers challenged the 
statute in the Arizona Supreme Court, arguing that the Arizona 
statute violates the Establishment Clause of the United States 
Constitution,15 as well as three provisions of the Arizona 
Constitution, since the statute authorizes the use of funds raised 
through the State tax system to directly support religious 
 
scholarships or tuition grants to students without limiting availability to only students of 
one school.” 
 7 Winn v. Killian, 307 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 8 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(A)(1)-(2). 
 9 Id. § 43-1089(A). 
 10 Id. § 43-1089(B). 
 11 Id. § 43-1089(D). 
 12 Id. § 43-1089(F)(3). 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. § 43-1089(F)(2). 
 15 U.S. CONST. amend. I (the Establishment Clause, made applicable to the states by 
the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part that, “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).  See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 8 (1947) (Justices unanimously agreed that the Establishment Clause applies to the 
States through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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education.16  Ultimately, the Arizona Supreme Court held that 
A.R.S. § 1089 did not violate either the United States or the 
Arizona Constitution, and that the STO tax credit was therefore 
a valid exercise of the Arizona Legislature’s prerogative.17 
B.  The Arizona Tax Credit Finds its Way into Federal Court 
In February 2000, another group of Arizona taxpayers 
(Taxpayers) brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Arizona (federal district court) against Mark W. 
Killian (Director of Revenue),18 in his official capacity as the 
Director of the Arizona Department of Revenue, alleging that the 
A.R.S. § 1089 STO tax credit program violates both the United 
States and Arizona Constitutions.19  The Taxpayers sought to 
enjoin any future operation of the STO program and an 
injunction requiring the return of funds already distributed to 
but not yet spent by the STOs to the State’s general fund.20 
The Director of Revenue moved to dismiss the suit on two 
theories: (1) immunity from suit pursuant to the Eleventh 
Amendment;21 and (2) the federal district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction due to the TIA22 and principles of comity.23  
Without ruling on the Eleventh Amendment argument, the 
federal district court granted the Director of Revenue’s motion to 
dismiss the suit on grounds that the TIA and principles of comity 
preclude the Taxpayers’ suit in federal district court.24 
The TIA provides in its entirety as follows: “[t]he district 
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy 
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy 
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”25  
In arguing that the TIA barred the Taxpayers’ suit in district 
court, the Director of Revenue urged that the relief sought by the 
 
 16 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 610 (Ariz. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 921 
(1999). 
 17 Id. at 625. 
 18 J. Elliott Hibbs replaced Mark W. Killian as the Director of the Arizona 
Department of Revenue on January 6, 2003, and was therefore substituted as the 
Defendant in this action when it reached the United States Supreme Court by writ of 
certiorari.  Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits at 4 n.1, Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004) 
(No. 02-1809) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 19 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1014. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1014-15; U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States 
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”). 
 22 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
 23 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1014-15. 
 24 Id. at 1015. 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
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Taxpayers—enjoinment of the STO program—would interfere 
with Arizona’s system of tax “assessment” as that term is used in 
the TIA.26  Essentially, the Director of Revenue adopted a broad 
reading of the term “assessment,” arguing that it refers to the 
overall system by which the State determines a respective 
taxpayer’s overall tax liability to the state.27  The federal district 
court agreed with the Director of Revenue’s argument that the 
STO tax credit fell within the purview of Arizona’s tax 
“assessment,” and accordingly dismissed the Taxpayers’ suit.28 
The federal district court further held, as an alternative 
ground for dismissal of the suit, that principles of comity 
required dismissal of the Taxpayers’ suit.29  According to the 
federal district court, any federal court action that disrupts the 
tax administration of a state is barred by principles of comity, 
regardless of whether the action relates to tax collection, tax 
deductions, or tax credits.30  Therefore, even if invalidation of the 
contested tax policy results in an increase in state revenues (as 
would be the case with the invalidation of the STO tax credit 
program), this nevertheless constitutes federal interference with 
a state’s tax administration, and therefore violates principles of 
comity. 
The Taxpayers appealed the federal district court decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth 
Circuit), which reversed the federal district court’s decision, 
holding that neither the TIA nor principles of comity barred the 
Taxpayers’ federal challenge to the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit.31  In 
Winn v. Killian, the Ninth Circuit’s decision turned on the 
applicable meaning of the term “assessment” as used in the TIA, 
and concluded that both the Director of Revenue’s and the federal 
district court’s reading of the term was overly broad, and that the 
TIA does not cover the STO tax credit.32  The Ninth Circuit 
referred to common dictionary definitions in determining the 
meaning of “assessment” as used in the TIA.  The Ninth Circuit 
claimed two definitions as relevant: “(1) ‘to estimate officially the 
value of (property, income, etc.) as a basis for taxation,’ and (2) ‘to 
impose a tax or other charge on.’”33  Regarding the first definition 
 
 26 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1015.  Unless otherwise indicated by the context, when the term 
“assessment” appears in quotation marks within the text of this Note, the term is to be 
understood in its general usage. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at 1018. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1020. 
 32 Id. at 1015. 
 33 Id. (citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 90 (1979)). 
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of “assessment” offered by the Ninth Circuit, the court found it 
persuasive that “the STO [tax] credit available to a taxpayer is a 
uniform amount that is applied to the calculation of taxes after a 
taxpayer’s gross income has been determined and therefore plays 
no part in the ‘assessment’ of property or income as a basis for 
the imposition of taxes . . . .”34  The Ninth Circuit found the 
second definition inapplicable to the STO tax credit because 
A.R.S. § 1089 did not impose a tax; rather, it benefits taxpayers 
by excusing them from paying an already assessed tax.35  
Essentially, in establishing a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability, 
the Ninth Circuit narrowly defined “assessment” to cover only 
those tax calculations made in the course of determining a 
taxpayer’s gross income, and not those made after gross income 
has been determined.36 
The Ninth Circuit referred to the two purposes of the TIA in 
concluding that the relief sought by the Taxpayers, if granted, 
would not result in a violation of the purposes or policies behind 
the TIA as desired by Congress in enacting the statute in 1937.37  
The first purpose, which the Ninth Circuit did not view as 
relevant, involved the ability of foreign parties to bypass state 
courts for the more favorable federal district court forum in tax 
cases.38  According to the Ninth Circuit, the second purpose of the 
TIA was to prevent the disruption of a state’s ability to collect tax 
revenues.39  While admitting that the Ninth Circuit had not 
previously ruled on the TIA’s application to state tax credits, the 
court ultimately held that the TIA does not bar a suit challenging 
a state tax credit in a federal district court, since the invalidation 
of a tax credit does not affect a state’s ability to raise revenue and 
therefore does not violate the second purpose of the TIA.40  On 
the contrary, if the courts invalidated the STO tax credit, 
Arizona’s ability to raise tax revenues would actually be 
enhanced, since the contributions that were otherwise going to 
the STOs would be redirected into the state fund.41 
In the latter part of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
 
 34 Id. at 1015 (footnote omitted). 
 35 Id. 
 36 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 6. 
 37 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1016. 
 38 Prior to passage of the TIA, foreign parties could sue a state for injunctive relief in 
federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and avoid paying the disputed tax in 
state court until the case was resolved.  State residents, on the other hand, could not 
obtain diversity jurisdiction and were forced to litigate the matter in state courts, which 
required the resident taxpayer to pay the tax deficiency prior to litigation.  Id. at 1016 
n.6. 
 39 Id. at 1016. 
 40 Id. at 1017. 
 41 Id. 
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the federal district court’s alternative ground for dismissal of the 
action: principles of comity preclude suits that involve federal 
court interference with state tax systems.42  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Arizona’s tax administration would not be 
substantially affected if A.R.S. § 1089 were invalidated, since 
A.R.S. § 1089 represents such a small portion of Arizona’s tax 
system.43  Furthermore, because principles of comity apply to 
federal court injunctive relief that affect a state’s ability to collect 
tax revenue, and because invalidation of A.R.S. § 1089 would 
increase Arizona’s tax collection, principles of comity do not bar 
the Taxpayers’ suit.44 
Subsequent to the Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the federal 
district court decision, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the 
case en banc.45  In his dissenting opinion, Judge Kleinfeld 
criticized the Ninth Circuit’s adopted definition of “assessment,” 
and instead used a broader definition of “assessment” as “the 
process of calculating a person’s final tax bill after all deductions 
and credits are accounted for.”46  In support of this broad 
definition of “assessment,” Judge Kleinfeld referred to definitions 
of the term found in another lay dictionary,47 a law dictionary,48 
and the Internal Revenue Code.49  According to Judge Kleinfeld’s 
broad definition of “assessment,” the TIA plainly “deprives the 
federal courts of jurisdiction to enjoin states from granting tax 
credits as part of the calculation of taxes due.”50  Furthermore, 
Judge Kleinfeld stated that even if the TIA does not bar the 
Taxpayers’ suit, principles of comity would act as a bar to the 
suit, since “long before Congress passed the [TIA], federal courts 
ordinarily declined jurisdiction over challenges to state taxes.”51  
Judge Kleinfeld stressed the importance of not assuming that 
federal judges are in the exclusive position of interpreting the 
Constitution and the people’s federal rights, since “[s]tate judges 
 
 42 Winn, 307 F.3d at 1018. 
 43 Id. at 1020. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc). 
 46 Id. at 912 (emphasis added). 
 47 Id. at 912 n.9 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 131 
(1981) (an “assessment” is “the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing”)). 
 48 Id. at 912 n.10 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (6th ed. 1990) 
(“assessment” refers to “determining the share of a tax to be paid by each of many 
persons”). 
 49 Id. at 912 n.12 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 6203 (2002) (“assessment shall be made by 
recording the liability of the taxpayer”)).  Unless the context indicates otherwise, all 
references to a “Section,” “§,” the “Code,” or “IRC” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 as in effect on June 1, 2004. 
 50 Winn, 321 F.3d 911, 913. 
 51 Id. 
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take the same oath to uphold the federal Constitution that 
[federal judges] do, and like [federal judges] are subject to federal 
Supreme Court review.”52 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Holding and its Reasoning 
In Hibbs v. Winn, the United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to decide whether the TIA bars constitutional 
challenges to state tax credits.53  The Court, in a 5 to 4 decision 
delivered by Justice Ginsburg, affirmed the Ninth Circuit, thus 
allowing the Taxpayers’ suit challenging the A.R.S. § 1089 tax 
credit to proceed in federal district court without impediment 
from the TIA or principles of comity.54 
Justice Ginsburg noted that federal courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, have previously adjudicated 
challenges to state tax credits and have never before viewed the 
TIA as precluding federal court jurisdiction.55  Justice Ginsburg 
noted the line of post-Brown v. Board of Education56 cases in 
which states used tuition grants and tax credits in an effort to 
promote racial segregation in public and private schools, and how 
the Court upheld the Constitution’s equal protection requirement 
under these challenges without impediment from the TIA.57  
Justice Ginsburg therefore rejected the Director of Revenue’s 
argument that the TIA prohibits all lower federal court 
interference with state tax systems.58 
Justice Ginsburg first determined that the Taxpayers sought 
the following forms of prospective relief: injunctive relief 
prohibiting A.R.S. § 1089 tax credits for payments made to STOs 
that make religion-based grants; a declaration that A.R.S. § 
1089, on its face and as applied, violates the Establishment 
Clause of the United States Constitution; and an order that the 
Director of Revenue notify all participating STOs that all funds 
within their possession are to be returned to the state general 
fund.59  With this in mind, Justice Ginsburg asked whether this 
prospective relief, in terms of the TIA, “seek[s] to ‘enjoin, suspend 
 
 52 Id. at 914. 
 53 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004). The Court first dealt with the issue of 
whether Director of Revenue’s petition for certiorari was timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c), 
and ultimately concluded that the petition was timely, thus giving the Court jurisdiction 
to decide whether the TIA bars Taxpayers’ suit.  See id. at 2284.  This issue is not 
relevant for purposes of this Note, and thus merits no further discussion. 
 54 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281-82. 
 55 Id. at 2281. 
 56 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 57 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281 (citing Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward 
County, 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964)). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 2284-85. 
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or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under 
State law.’”60  The answer to this question turned on the meaning 
of “assessment,” as used in the TIA, to determine if a challenge to 
a state tax credit falls within the prohibition of the TIA.61 
In determining the correct meaning of “assessment,” Justice 
Ginsburg ruled that it is imperative to read the term in its 
context and not in isolation.62  According to Justice Ginsburg, if 
the term “assessment,” as the Director of Revenue asserts, were 
in isolation to mean “the entire plan or scheme fixed upon for 
charging or taxing,” the TIA would have no need for the words 
“levy” or “collection” that follow “assessment” in the language of 
the statute.63  Essentially, the term “assessment” would be all 
that is necessary for purposes of the TIA, since this expansive 
reading of “assessment” would necessarily include the functions 
of “levy” and “collection.”64  Because the Court follows the “rule 
against superfluities” in a statute, Justice Ginsburg refused to 
accept the Director of Revenue’s definition of “assessment” as 
encompassing the entire taxing scheme, since this would render 
the terms “levy” and “collection” superfluous.65 
Justice Ginsburg criticized Justice Kennedy’s dissenting 
opinion (discussed infra) for adopting a conflicting position on the 
proper definition of “assessment.”66  According to Justice 
Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy’s dissent twice adopts the Director of 
Revenue’s definition of “assessment” as “‘the entire plan or 
scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing,’” but later defines 
“assessment” in a manner that “would disconnect the word from 
the enforcement process (‘levy or collection’) that ‘assessment’ 
sets in motion.”67 
Based on the TIA’s legislative history, Justice Ginsburg 
ruled that the TIA was modeled on earlier federal statutes that 
paralleled state provisions prohibiting “‘actions in State courts to 
enjoin the collection of State and county taxes.’”68  Of particular 
influence was the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA),69 which bars “‘any 
court’” from adjudicating a suit brought  “‘for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any [federal] tax.’”70  
 
 60 Id. at 2285 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)). 
 61 Id. at 2285. 
 62 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2285. 
 63 Id. at 2286 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (rev. 6th ed. 2000)). 
 66 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2286 n.4. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 2286 (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 1 (1937)). 
 69 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2005). 
 70 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2286 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2005)). 
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According to Justice Ginsburg, the AIA was meant to serve two 
main purposes: (1) to reflect the Government’s desire to assess 
and collect taxes as quickly as possible without judicial 
impediment; and (2) to require that the legal right to any 
disputed sums be a suit for refund.71  Therefore, just as the AIA 
prevents federal court injunctions over federal tax collections, the 
TIA prevents federal court restraints over state tax collections.72 
In discussing the legislative history of the TIA, Justice 
Ginsburg held that the Senate Report identified two state-
revenue-protective objectives of the TIA: 
(1) to eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek 
injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state corporations 
asserting diversity jurisdiction—and taxpayers with recourse only to 
state courts, which generally required taxpayers to pay first and 
litigate later; and (2) to stop taxpayers, with the aid of a federal 
injunction, from withholding large sums, thereby disrupting state 
government finances.73 
Based on this legislative history, Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that in enacting the TIA, Congress focused on taxpayers who 
sought to avoid paying their taxes by resorting to a federal court 
forum, which is not the procedure specified by the Internal 
Revenue Service.74  Justice Ginsburg therefore read the TIA’s 
legislative history as not indicating a congressional purpose to 
prevent all federal court interference with state tax systems.75 
In discussing the legislative history of the TIA, the Director 
of Revenue argued that Congress, in enacting the TIA, relied on 
the congressional purpose underlying the Johnson Act of 1934.76  
The Johnson Act provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he district 
courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or 
compliance with, [public-utility rate orders made by state 
regulatory bodies].”77  In juxtaposing the TIA with the Johnson 
Act, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the two Acts were 
significantly different in their respective underlying 
congressional intents, since “[t]he TIA does not prohibit 
interference with ‘the operation of, or compliance with’ state tax 
laws,” but instead prohibits interference only with the areas of 
state tax systems that are used to generate revenue, such as 
 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 2287. 
 73 Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 75-1035, at 1-2 (1937)). 
 74 Id. at 2288. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 20 (citing California v. Grace Brethren 
Church, 457 U.S. 393, 409 n.22 (1982)). 
 77 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2003). 
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assessment, levy, and collection.78 
Justice Ginsburg held that the TIA, consistent with the will 
of Congress, has been interpreted by the Court to only apply to 
cases in which the state taxpayer attempts to avoid paying state 
taxes by seeking the aid of the federal courts.79  In furthering this 
position, Justice Ginsburg cited California v. Grace Brethren 
Church,80 in which the Court “recognized that the principal 
purpose of the TIA was to ‘limit drastically’ federal-court-
interference with ‘the collection of [state] taxes.’”81  Grace 
Brethren Church, according to Justice Ginsburg, dealt with 
taxpayers who attempted to institute federal actions in order to 
bypass available state remedies, precisely what the TIA is meant 
to prohibit.82  Justice Ginsburg announced that Grace Brethren 
Church stands for the proposition that the TIA does not prevent 
federal court review of all aspects of state tax systems, but 
instead prevents federal court review only of issues pertaining to 
the collection of revenue in state tax systems, which is contrary to 
the positions taken by both the Director of Revenue and the 
dissent.83 
Justice Ginsburg next addressed the issue of what 
constitutes “‘a plain, speedy and efficient remedy’” in a state 
court as required by the TIA.84  Justice Ginsburg noted that the 
Court had previously addressed the issue of what constitutes “‘a 
plain, speedy and efficient remedy’” per the TIA, and concluded 
that the remedy is not the same for all plaintiffs who sue the 
State, but is instead custom fit for taxpayers who sue the State.85 
In the final part of the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
 
 78 Winn, 124 S. Ct at 2288 n.7. 
 79 Id. at 2289. 
 80 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 408 (1982). 
 81 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2288 (citing Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 408-09) 
(citation omitted). 
 82 Id. at 2288. 
 83 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2288-89.  See also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, v. 
McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 105-06 (1981) (taxpayers sought damages determined by alleged 
tax overassessments based on taxation of real property); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
450 U.S. 503, 510 (1981) (taxpayer refused to pay state taxes because she deemed them 
unfair); Ark. v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 824 (1997) (corporations 
claimed they were exempt from state taxes and refused to pay); Nat’l Private Truck 
Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 584 (1995) (action sought to prevent 
State from collecting taxes). 
 84 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2289. 
 85 Id. (citing Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 528 (holding that “Illinois’ legal remedy that 
provides property owners paying property taxes under protest a refund without interest 
in two years is a plain, speedy and efficient remedy under the [TIA]”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 411 (holding that “a state-court 
remedy is plain, speedy and efficient only if it provides the taxpayer with a full hearing 
and judicial determination at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to 
the tax”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)). 
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discussed how there have been many federal court decisions, 
including decisions of the Court that “have reached the merits of 
third-party constitutional challenges to tax benefits without 
mentioning the TIA.”86  Justice Ginsburg held that, “[c]onsistent 
with the decades-long understanding prevailing on this issue,” 
the challenge to the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit brought by the 
Taxpayers may be adjudicated in federal district court without 
any TIA opposition, thereby affirming the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision.87 
D.  The Dissent 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the dissent,88 criticized the 
majority for “show[ing] great skepticism for the state courts’ 
ability to vindicate constitutional wrongs” and for treating state 
courts as “second rate constitutional arbiters.”89  Justice Kennedy 
offered two points as evidence of the majority’s stance: (1) the 
majority’s interpretation of the TIA conflicts with the plain 
language and a literal reading of the statute’s terms, and (2) the 
majority’s assertion that Congress, in enacting the TIA, did not 
intend to include third-party suits that do not seek to stop the 
collection of a tax imposed on plaintiffs is not supported by the 
legislative history of the TIA.90  Justice Kennedy disapproves of 
the “[d]ismissive treatment” afforded by the majority to the state 
courts as constitutional arbiters, since the TIA expressly provides 
for a “federal safeguard:” federal court intervention if the State 
court fails to provide “‘a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.’”91  
Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, the majority disregards 
“the balance the [TIA] strikes between federal and state court 
adjudication.”92 
Justice Kennedy notes that while “unexamined custom” may 
have allowed some cases in the past to proceed as though the TIA 
 
 86 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2291.  See, e.g., Byrne v. Pub. Funds for Pub. Sch. of N.J., 590 
F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding a state tax deduction for parents with children who 
attend private schools is a violation of the Establishment Clause), aff’d, 442 U.S. 907 
(1979); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (state 
tax benefit for parents of children who attend private schools is a violation of the 
Establishment Clause); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (state tax deduction for 
parents of children who attend parochial schools is not a violation of the Establishment 
Clause); Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding a state statute that 
exempts certain religious books from a state tax is a violation of the Establishment 
Clause). 
 87 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2292. 
 88 Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined Justice 
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion. 
 89 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2292-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 2293. 
 92 Id. 
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does not apply to challenges to state tax credits, this 
“unexamined custom” is not conclusive, and the terms and 
purpose of the TIA alone are conclusive and controlling in 
determining the scope of the TIA.93  To determine whether the 
TIA bars the federal district court from granting injunctive relief 
against the STO tax credit, Justice Kennedy presented two 
necessary inquiries: (1) define “assessment,” as used in the TIA, 
and (2) decide whether an injunction preventing the Director of 
Revenue from permitting the STO tax credit “would enjoin, 
suspend, or restrain an assessment” for purposes of the TIA.94 
Like the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy noted that the 
term “assessment” is not to be understood in isolation, and must 
instead be read in light of the surrounding terms in the TIA.95  
Similar to the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that the TIA 
was modeled on the AIA,96 which provides “that federal courts 
may not restrain or enjoin an ‘assessment or collection of any 
[federal] tax.’”97  In order to determine the meaning of the term 
“assessment” as used in the AIA, Justice Kennedy referred to 
other provisions of the Code.98  Justice Kennedy concluded that, 
when read together, the provisions of the Code indicate that an 
assessment, for purposes of the AIA, “must at the least 
encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability,” 
and “[t]he recording of the [taxpayer’s] liability on the 
Government’s tax rolls is itself an assessment.”99  Therefore, 
because the TIA was modeled on the AIA, it follows that the term 
“assessment,” as used in the TIA, should be interpreted according 
to the Code’s use of the term, indicating that an “assessment” 
pertains to “a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.”100 
According to Justice Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit should not 
have principally relied on a dictionary definition in determining 
the meaning of “assessment,” since it is imperative that the 
definition be considered in light of the prior statute on which the 
TIA was based.101  Another problem with the Ninth Circuit’s 
reliance on a lay dictionary definition of “assessment” is that the 
Ninth Circuit used a dictionary that was not available in the year 
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 96 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a)(2005). 
 97 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 98 Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.). 
 99 Id. at 2294. 
 100 Id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978) (“[W]here, as here, Congress 
adopts a new law incorporating sections of a prior law, Congress can normally be 
presumed to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to the incorporated law, at 
least insofar as it affects the new statute.”). 
 101 Id. 
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the TIA was enacted.102  Justice Kennedy further noted that the 
Ninth Circuit omitted a relevant definition of “assessment” from 
the dictionary it used: “(2) to fix or determine the amount of 
(damages, a tax, a fine, etc.).”103  Justice Kennedy found comfort 
in Judge Kleinfeld’s dissenting opinion from denial of rehearing 
en banc, which noted that the Ninth Circuit would have 
discovered relevant, broader definitions of “assessment” had it 
looked in different lay dictionaries and the Code.104 
Justice Kennedy addressed the Taxpayers’ argument 
alleging that the TIA does not prohibit the injunction against the 
STO tax credits, since the Director of Revenue, even after the 
STO tax credit is enjoined, will be able to enforce taxpayer 
liabilities, and the elimination of the STO tax credit will actually 
increase tax revenue.105  Justice Kennedy dismissed this 
argument, since it ignores some highly relevant wording in the 
TIA: “under State law.”106  According to Justice Kennedy, the TIA 
prohibits federal district courts “from enjoining, suspending, or 
restraining a State from recording the taxpayer liability that 
state law mandates.”107  A.R.S. § 1089 is an Arizona State law, 
and is necessary in determining an Arizona taxpayer’s tax 
liability to the State.108  Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy, 
a federal court order directing the Director of Revenue to refrain 
from recording on the State’s tax rolls taxpayer liability in 
absence of the STO tax credit would effectively prevent the 
Director of Revenue from accurately recording taxpayer liability 
under State law.109  This sort of directive order, according to 
Justice Kennedy, is precisely what the plain language of the TIA 
forbids.110 
Justice Kennedy next distinguished prior cases used by the 
majority to support the majority’s position that the Court and 
other federal courts have adjudicated non-taxpayer challenges to 
tax credits without impediment from the AIA.111  These cases are 
distinguishable on the grounds that if the plaintiffs in these suits 
 
 102 Id. 
 103 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 104 Id. (citing Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
 105 Id. at 2295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 106 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003)). 
 107 Id. at 2296. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id.  See, e.g., McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448, 453-54 (D.D.C. 1972) (“The 
preferred course of raising [such tax exemption and deduction] objections in a suit for 
refund is not available. In this situation we cannot read the statute to bar the present 
suit.”). 
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had been barred by the AIA they would have had no other forum 
in which to adjudicate their claims.112  According to Justice 
Kennedy, the TIA, unlike the AIA, by its own explicit terms 
ensures that an acceptable forum exists for those suits that it 
bars.113  Where a State court is unable to provide “‘a plain, 
speedy, and efficient remedy,’” federal district courts are the next 
available forum, and ultimately, the litigant may resort to the 
United States Supreme Court, whether the case was originally 
heard in a federal district court or a State court.114  Justice 
Kennedy noted that the majority mistakenly failed to address 
this exception in the TIA, and that this exception “represents a 
congressional judgment about the balance that should exist 
between the respect due to the States (for both their 
administration of tax schemes and their courts’ interpretation of 
tax laws) and the need for constitutional vindication.”115  Based 
on this codified exception in the TIA, Justice Kennedy concluded 
that this exception does not apply to the instant case, since a 
similar action was already heard in Arizona State court,116 in 
which the State court was able to provide “‘a plain, speedy, and 
efficient remedy.’”117  Therefore, according to Justice Kennedy’s 
reading of the TIA, the Taxpayers’ suit does not fall within this 
exception to the TIA, and the federal district court accordingly 
lacked proper subject matter jurisdiction, since the Taxpayers 
were already afforded an adequate remedy in State court.118 
Justice Kennedy criticized the majority for its interpretation 
of the TIA’s legislative history, arguing that the majority’s 
reading is inconsistent with earlier Court interpretations of the 
TIA.119  Citing California v. Grace Brethren Church120 as a prime 
example, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court has previously 
understood the purpose of the TIA as “not only to protect the 
[State] fisc but also to protect the State’s tax system 
administration and tax policy implementation.”121  In Grace 
Brethren Church, the Court held that “‘[i]f federal declaratory 
relief were available to test state tax assessments, state tax 
administration might be thrown into disarray, and taxpayers 
might escape the ordinary procedural requirements imposed by 
 
 112 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 113 Id. at 2297. 
 114 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003)). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999). 
 117 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2297 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. at 2298. 
 120 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). 
 121 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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state law.’”122  This quote from Grace Brethren Church, according 
to Justice Kennedy, clearly demonstrates that the TIA’s primary 
concern is to prevent federal court interference with a State’s 
entire tax collection system, and not merely the revenue 
collecting aspect of it.123  Based on this reading of the TIA, 
Justice Kennedy disagrees with the majority’s decision, since the 
majority assumed that the primary purpose of the TIA is to 
prohibit federal district courts from issuing orders that would 
decrease tax revenues in state funds.124  Justice Kennedy argued 
that the TIA’s purpose is not limited to preventing federal court 
orders that would decrease tax revenues, but is instead meant to 
prevent federal court orders that would lead to a disruption in a 
State’s entire tax collection efforts in any manner, which includes 
invalidating state tax credits.125 
In the final part of his dissent, Justice Kennedy addressed 
the majority’s argument that federal courts, through “years of 
unexamined habit,” have adjudicated suits challenging state tax 
credits.126  Justice Kennedy dismissed this argument by stating 
that “[t]he exercise of federal jurisdiction does not and cannot 
establish jurisdiction,” and that “[w]hile [the Court] should not 
reverse the course of our unexamined practice lightly, our 
obligation is to give a correct interpretation of the statute.”127  
Justice Kennedy argued that simply because the Court has never 
before considered the jurisdictional issue in the case at bar, the 
Court should not resort to following the unexamined habit of the 
Court to hear challenges to state tax credits, and should instead 
follow the clear statutory mandate of the TIA.128 
 
 122 Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410 (quoting Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 
127 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 123 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2298-99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 124 Id. at 2297-98. 
 125 Id. at 2298-99. 
 126 Id. at 2300. 
 127 Id. (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) 
(holding that the “Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it 
was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio.”)). 
 128 Id. at 2301. 
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III.  OPENING THE DOOR FOR FEDERAL COURT INTRUSION INTO 
STATE TAX SYSTEMS—DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WINN HOLDING 
AND ITS REASONING 
A.  The Majority Misinterpreted the Plain Language and Intent 
of the TIA 
1.  The Majority Misinterpreted the Term “Assessment” as 
Used in the TIA 
Prior to the majority’s decision in Winn, the statutory 
language of the TIA was seemingly clear, concise, and 
unambiguous.  The TIA prohibits federal district courts from 
“enjoin[ing], suspend[ing] or restrain[ing] the assessment, levy or 
collection” of any state tax as long as there is a “plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy” in the state court.129  The issue presented before 
the Winn Court was whether enjoining a state tax credit qualifies 
as an interference with an “assessment” as that term is used in 
the TIA.130  The plain language of the TIA is the correct starting 
point for the Court’s determination, since plain and unambiguous 
statutory language is the clearest indicator of congressional 
intent, and therefore ends the inquiry.131 
Understood in its most ordinary and sensible usage, in 
relation to state taxes, “assessment . . . must at the least 
encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.  
This is what the taxpayer owes the Government.”132  Instead of 
referring to the ordinary meaning of “assessment” as used in the 
context of both the TIA and federal and state precedent, the 
Ninth Circuit relied on a lay dictionary definition of 
“assessment,” and concluded that an “assessment” was the 
official estimate of the value of income or property used to 
calculate a tax or the imposition of a tax on someone.133  The 
most troubling part of the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on the lay 
dictionary definition is that the court ignored a more relevant 
definition found in the same dictionary: “(2) to fix or determine 
 
 129 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 130 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281. 
 131 See, e.g., Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (holding that the 
Court begins with the statutory language in its inquiry); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 
450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981) (“The starting point of our inquiry is the plain language of the 
statute itself.”). 
 132 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see also 
United States v. Galletti, 124 S. Ct. 1548, 1553-54 (2004) (“In its numerous uses 
throughout the Code, it is clear that the term ‘assessment’ refers to little more than the 
calculation or recording of a tax liability. . . . The Federal tax system is basically one of 
self-assessment, whereby each taxpayer computes the tax due and then files the 
appropriate form . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 133 Winn v. Killian, 307 F.3d 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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the amount of (damages, a tax, a fine, etc.).”134  This additional 
definition is in accordance with the broad meaning ascribed to 
the term “assessment” by both the Director of Revenue135 and the 
dissent,136 and suggests that “assessment” refers to a taxpayer’s 
overall tax liability to the government.137  A tax credit is used in 
determining a taxpayer’s overall tax liability, since the amount of 
the credit is deducted from the “below-the-line” amount of taxes a 
taxpayer owes to the government.138 
Definitions of “assessment” found in other dictionaries, 
including lay dictionaries available in 1937 when the TIA was 
enacted, also support this broad definition of “assessment.”  For 
example, a lay dictionary available in 1937 provides the following 
relevant definitions of “assessment”: “act of apportioning or 
determining an amount to be paid;” “the entire plan or scheme 
fixed upon for charging or taxing.”139  In Black’s Law Dictionary, 
“‘assessment’ is defined as ‘determining the share of a tax to be 
paid by each of many persons’. . . .[and] ‘the process of 
ascertaining and adjusting the shares respectively to be 
contributed by several persons’ such as an individual’s final tax 
bill.”140 
What is perhaps the most relevant definition of the term 
“assessment” is found in the Code, as it provides that 
“assessment shall be made by recording the liability of the 
taxpayer.”141  As Judge Kleinfeld correctly noted in his dissent, 
“under the congressional understanding in the tax code, 
‘assessment’ refers to the bottom line, how much money the 
 
 134 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 135 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 12 (“[A] ‘tax assessment’ is a tax bill: the 
final amount owed to the government. Under that ordinary and sensible understanding of 
the word ‘assessment,’ a federal court challenge to a state tax credit—a component of a 
taxpayer’s ultimate liability—is barred by the plain terms of the [TIA].”). 
 136 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2294 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[A]n assessment . . . must at 
the least encompass the recording of a taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 137 Further evidence of the broad meaning of “assessment” is found by looking at 
Arizona’s tax system.  On the 2000 Arizona Resident Personal Income Tax Return (Form 
140), Arizona taxpayers determine their ultimate tax liability by accounting for all 
deductions and credits.  See also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 16 n.4 (citing 85 
C.J.S. Taxation § 1758 (2003) (“In making an assessment [of taxes], the assessing officer 
should take into account all deductions and credits to which the taxpayer is lawfully 
entitled, and compute them in the manner required by the statute.”) (emphasis added). 
 138 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1501 (8th ed. 2004) ([A “tax credit” is] “[a]n amount 
subtracted directly from one’s total tax liability, dollar for dollar, as opposed to a 
deduction from gross income.”). 
 139 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
131 (2d ed. 1934). 
 140 Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 116-17 (6th ed. 1990)) 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 141 26 U.S.C. § 6203 (2005). 
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taxpayer owes to the government in taxes, after consideration of 
any credits as well as deductions.”142  This broad understanding 
of the term “assessment” is the most common sense 
understanding of the term, and is consistent with the broad 
purpose intended by Congress in enacting the TIA.  Because the 
term “assessment” is followed by the terms “levy” and 
“collection,”143 the TIA indicates a congressional intent to 
encompass the entire taxing process, beginning with the 
determination of the taxpayer’s ultimate tax liability (i.e., the 
“assessment”) and concluding with the collection of that 
liability.144 
The Winn Court, in construing the meaning of the term 
“assessment” to counter-intuitive limits, has effectively legislated 
from the bench by disregarding the clear intent of Congress in 
enacting the TIA, thereby allowing federal courts with already 
overburdened dockets to hear cases that Congress specifically 
legislated to exclude.  By accepting an irrelevant lay dictionary 
definition as conclusive authority, the Winn Court has effectively 
undermined the Legislature in its capacity as the government 
branch entrusted with the duty of creating and determining laws, 
and has shown complete disregard for congressional purpose. 
2.  The TIA Should not be Limited to Instances of Tax 
Collection 
The majority erred in finding that the TIA pertains only to 
those situations in which the State’s revenue collecting function 
has been hindered.  The Court has previously made clear that the 
purpose of the TIA is to protect a State’s entire tax system and 
not merely the revenue collecting aspect of it.145  Nowhere in the 
language of the TIA is there mention of the TIA being limited to 
situations in which a challenge to a State tax would hinder the 
State’s ability to collect revenue.146  Quite the contrary, the 
language of the TIA clearly demonstrates that “[t]he district 
 
 142 Winn, 321 F.3d at 912-13 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en 
banc) (emphasis added).  See also American Civil Liberties Union Found. of La. v. 
Bridges, 334 F.3d 416, 421 (5th Cir. 2003) (defining “assessment” as “‘the entire plan or 
scheme fixed upon for charging or taxing’”). 
 143 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
 144 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2298-99 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (The 
terms “assessment,” “levy,” and “collection” represent the three main stages of a State tax 
system: (1) the determination of the taxpayer’s overall tax liability (“assessment”); (2) the 
imposition of the tax (“levy”); and (3) collecting the tax owed (“collection”)). 
 145 Id.  (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 
U.S. 393, 409 n.22 (1982) (“[T]he legislative history of the [TIA] demonstrates that 
Congress worried not so much about the form of relief available in the federal courts, as 
about divesting the federal courts of jurisdiction to interfere with state tax 
administration.”). 
 146 See 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003). 
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courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy 
or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”147  
Because the TIA refers to “any tax,” it seems clear that even an 
aspect of a State tax system that does not add to revenue 
collection, such as a tax credit, is nevertheless meant to fall 
under the purview of the TIA, since a tax credit is fundamentally 
related to a State’s entire tax system.148 
A federal court order that interferes with a state tax credit is 
just as intrusive into a State’s tax system as is a federal court 
order that interferes with a State’s ability to raise and collect 
taxes.149  Accordingly, a tax credit should not be deemed to be 
outside the purview of the TIA simply because a tax credit does 
not lead to an increase in a State’s tax revenues.150  Tax scholars 
agree that a tax credit is an imperative determination in the 
assessment of a tax, and taking account for a tax credit is the 
final step in determining a taxpayer’s overall tax liability.151  In 
the case at bar, the majority should not have limited the term 
“assessment” to the revenue collecting aspect of a State’s tax 
system and should have instead interpreted the term to 
encompass the taxpayer’s overall tax liability, tax credits 
included.152 
 
 147 Id. (emphasis added). 
 148 See id.  It is interesting to note that in a Ninth Circuit decision following Hibbs v. 
Winn, the court discussed the legislative history and congressional intent behind the TIA, 
stating that “[a]side from its general concern with protecting state revenues, Congress 
viewed the [TIA] as a mechanism for steering challenges to state tax laws into state 
courts.”  May Trucking Co. v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 388 F.3d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 149 See, e.g., United Brewers Ass’n v. Perez, 592 F.2d 1212, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979) 
(holding that litigation that would increase the amount of taxes collected would 
nevertheless “disrupt the orderly collection and administration of state taxes”); In re 
Gillis, 836 F.2d 1001, 1008 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that “the interference by the federal 
courts into the state tax system is the same in degree and kind as a suit seeking to enjoin 
a state tax”). 
 150 See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (holding that the 
ultimate effect of invalidating a state tax exemption cannot be predicted with complete 
accuracy). 
 151 See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
929 (13th ed. 2004) (“The final step in computing a taxpayer’s regular tax liability is to 
reduce the taxpayer’s tax liability . . . by the amount of any tax credits allowed to the 
taxpayer.  The amount of tax that must be paid by the taxpayer when filing an income tax 
return is generally less than the computed tax liability for the year, because the potential 
payment is reduced by tax credits.”). 
 152 In a recent Fifth Circuit decision interpreting Hibbs v. Winn, the court was 
confronted with the issue of whether the federal district courts could exercise proper 
subject matter jurisdiction over a claim that the State of Louisiana’s prestige license plate 
program facially discriminates against pro-choice views, thus violating the First 
Amendment.  Henderson v. Stalder, 407 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2005).  The Henderson court 
held that the costs associated with the prestige license plates were in fact “taxes,” and in 
light of Hibbs v. Winn, the federal district court was barred from hearing the case as a 
result of the TIA.  Id. at 358-59.  The Henderson court noted that, “Hibbs opened the 
federal courthouse doors slightly notwithstanding the limits of the TIA.” Id. at 359. 
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3.  The Majority Ignored That There Existed a “Plain, 
Speedy and Efficient Remedy” in Arizona State Court 
The language of the TIA itself provides for the appropriate 
time at which a federal court may intervene in the State tax 
system: “where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may [not] be 
had in the courts of such State.”153  As Justice Kennedy noted in 
his dissenting opinion, the TIA has a “codified exception” to the 
prohibition against federal court intervention, which allows 
federal court interference in state tax systems only where the 
taxpayer is unable to receive “‘a plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy’” in her State court.154  Justice Ginsburg and the majority 
overlooked this crucial language in the TIA, which represents the 
fact that Congress has already made the determination as to 
what sort of balance should exist among the federal and state 
courts in regards to a State’s ability to administer its own tax 
system.155 
In the years following the enactment of the TIA, the Court 
took a broad stance as to what constitutes a “‘plain, speedy and 
efficient remedy in State court,’” often finding judicial remedies 
in state courts to be inadequate.156  However, in more recent 
decisions, the Court has narrowly construed the statutory 
language of the TIA and seems to presume that state court 
remedies are “plain, speedy and efficient” for purposes of the TIA, 
thus prohibiting federal court intervention.157  As a result of 
 
(emphasis added).  In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the Hibbs 
decision as allowing federal district court intervention into a state tax matter in spite of 
the TIA, only if “the suit’s success will enrich, not deplete, the government entity’s coffers.”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 153 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 154 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2297 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 155 Id. 
 156 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 710; see, e.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. 
McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1944) (holding that the federal district court was not 
barred by the TIA because there was an absence of state court interpretations of the 
contested tax law, and this created uncertainty sufficient to justify federal court 
intervention); Hillsborough Twp. v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 626 (1946) (holding that a 
“plain, speedy and efficient remedy” did not exist in the State court, thus permitting the 
federal district court to bypass the TIA, since there existed uncertainty as to the adequacy 
of the state remedy); Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 306 (1952) 
(holding that because the taxpayer would have been required to file over 300 separate 
claims in fourteen different counties under state law, the remedy was not “plain, speedy 
and efficient,” and the federal district court was permitted to take jurisdiction as an 
exception to the TIA). 
 157 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 711; see, e.g., Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 73 
(1976) (holding that a State requirement that a taxpayer post a bond for the amount of 
the tax in controversy in order to be heard in State court is a “‘plain, speedy and efficient 
remedy,’” even though situations may exist in which the taxpayer is unable to post the 
bond); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 528 (1981) (holding that the State 
remedy was adequate, despite the fact that the taxpayer was required to pay the taxes 
owed first and then sue for a refund, the taxpayer was not entitled to interest on the 
refund if successful in court, and it usually took two years for the suit to be heard in State 
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these recent cases, the Winn Court erred in allowing the 
Taxpayers’ suit to proceed in federal district court, since there 
existed a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” in Arizona State 
court, thus divesting the federal district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.158  This is evidenced by the 1999 Arizona Supreme 
Court case Kotterman v. Killian, in which a group of Arizona 
taxpayers, similarly situated to the Taxpayers in Winn, 
challenged the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit on Establishment Clause 
grounds.159  The Arizona Supreme Court ultimately held the 
A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit to be a valid law, thus ruling against the 
Killian taxpayers.160  It is notable that the United States 
Supreme Court denied review of the Kotterman decision.161 
Based on the current line of Supreme Court cases broadly 
interpreting the “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” requirement 
in the TIA, the Winn Court should have ruled against the 
Taxpayers, finding that they had an adequate remedy available 
in State court, thus divesting the federal district courts of subject 
matter jurisdiction over the case.  As Justice Kennedy noted in 
his dissenting opinion, the taxpayer who resorts to the State 
court is not exclusively confined to the State court forum; the 
United States Supreme Court is always an available federal 
forum that will review any state court decision.162 
B.  The Majority’s Holding is Contrary to the Broad Federalism 
Purpose of the TIA 
1.  The TIA was Enacted in the Broad Interest of State 
Sovereignty 
The TIA embodies principles of federalism: state 
governments are given deference to administer their own tax 
 
court); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 417 (1982) (holding that 
“because the appellees could seek a refund of their state unemployment insurance 
taxes . . . their remedy under state law was ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ within the 
meaning of the [TIA], and consequently, that the District Court had no jurisdiction to 
issue injunctive or declaratory relief.”). 
 158 Following Hibbs v. Winn, the Ninth Circuit discussed what constitutes “plain, 
speedy and efficient” for purposes of the TIA.  May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Dep’t of 
Transportation, 388 F.3d 1261, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2004). According to the May Trucking 
Co. court, “[f]or state-court remedies to be ‘plain,’ the procedures available in state court 
must be certain.”  Id. at 1270 (emphasis added).  Furthermore, “[t]he ‘efficiency’ of a state-
court remedy generally turns on whether it imposes an ‘unusual hardship . . . requiring 
ineffectual activity or an unnecessary expenditure of time or energy.’”  Id. at 1271 
(quoting Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 518). 
 159 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606 (Ariz. 1999). 
 160 Id. at 625. 
 161 Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 625 (Ariz. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 921 
(1999). 
 162 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2297 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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systems without undue federal impediment since Congress 
enacted the TIA in the interest of limiting federal interference 
with the crucial principal of state sovereignty.163  States may 
have a legitimate interest in promoting secondary school 
education for parents and their children because secondary 
schools are not state-funded, and the respective State may have 
an interest in decreasing the amount of children attending the 
public schools for state-revenue purposes.  In enacting A.R.S. § 
1089, the Arizona Legislature may have been attempting to 
persuade more Arizona taxpayers to send their children to 
secondary schools in order to lighten the burden on the State fisc 
since fewer funds would need to be directed to public schools if 
more children were attending secondary schools.164  As an 
incentive to send their children to secondary schools, Arizona 
taxpayers would receive the STO tax credit embodied in A.R.S. § 
1089.165  The Arizona Legislature made the determination that a 
tax credit, as opposed to a tax deduction, was the most 
persuasive means of motivating taxpayer’s to send their children 
to secondary schools, since a tax credit represents a greater 
overall deduction in tax liability.166  Regardless of the Arizona 
legislature’s intent in enacting A.R.S. § 1089, the contested STO 
tax credit is clearly a matter of Arizona State law, and the Winn 
majority erred in allowing federal courts to take jurisdiction over 
the matter in spite of the TIA’s bar on federal intrusion in state 
 
 163 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 710.  After the Court’s decision in Winn, the 
Ninth Circuit noted, in May Trucking Co. v. Oregon Dep’t of Transp., the two comity 
concerns furthered by the TIA:  “[f]irst, ‘[t]he Act is a gesture of comity toward states; 
recognizing the centrality of tax collection to the operation of government, the Act 
prevents taxpayers from running to federal court to stymie the collection of state 
taxes’. . . . Second, recognizing that challenges to state tax laws are ‘more properly heard 
in the state courts,’ the Act ensures that state courts are able to entertain challenges to 
their own tax laws in the first instance.”  May Trucking Co. v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 388 
F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 164 See Warren Richey, Case Could Boost Funding for Private Schools, CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 20, 2004, at 2, available at  
http://news.findlaw.com/csmonitor/s/20040120/20jan2004091835.html (“[A] ruling [in 
favor of Arizona in this case] would also provide a green light to those seeking increased 
government funding of religious schools, provided they have the state legislature’s 
support and the state judiciary’s approval.”). 
 165 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43-1089(A)-(B) (2004). 
 166 See FREELAND  ET AL., supra note 151, at 929-30 (“A credit of a certain dollar 
amount is more advantageous to the taxpayer than a deduction of the same dollar amount, 
because it reduces tax liability dollar-for-dollar, whereas a deduction reduces only taxable 
income with a corresponding but smaller reduction in tax liability.  Deductions effect 
greater tax savings as the taxpayer’s tax rate increases; in contrast, credits have the same 
dollar saving for all taxpayers who otherwise would pay tax, regardless of their tax 
brackets.  Tax legislation at one time reflected some movement away from deductions 
toward credits, possibly because of a policy decision that credits are more equitable.  With 
the adoption of modified flat tax rates, the movement from deductions to credits stalled 
although it has picked up some momentum in recent legislation.”) (emphasis added) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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tax matters.  As noted by Justice Kennedy, “[t]he TIA protects 
the responsibility of the States and their courts to administer 
their own tax systems and to be accountable to the citizens of the 
State for their policies and decisions.”167 
A further problem potentially spawned out of the Winn 
decision is that multi-state corporations are now able to engage 
in federal court forum shopping, which is one of the primary 
actions Congress intended to prevent in enacting the TIA.168  
Multi-state or out-of-state corporations are now given the 
opportunity to move directly into federal court through diversity 
jurisdiction in order to avoid a possibly prejudicial state forum.169  
An out-of-state corporation may wish to avoid a state court forum 
in order to avoid local biases and local favoritism towards local 
corporations.  Additionally, a foreign corporation challenging a 
state tax law may feel as though a state court would not be as 
quick to strike down the state tax law as would a federal court.170 
As a result of the majority’s decision in Winn, an out-of-state 
corporation that is troubled by the tax breaks afforded to local 
corporations, whether it be in the form of a tax credit, deduction, 
or exemption, is now able to challenge the State tax law in 
federal court, despite the fact that the State may have a 
legitimate interest in promoting the welfare of its local 
corporations.171  According to Winn, as long as the foreign 
corporation’s challenge would not have the effect of decreasing 
state revenues, the TIA will not act as a bar to the challenge, and 
the States will no longer be guaranteed the ability to afford 
benefits to their local corporations and businesses, which is a 
serious infringement on principles of state sovereignty.  This 
result is especially unfortunate in light of the fact that in 
discussing the legislative history of the TIA, Justice Ginsburg 
recognized that one of the twin objectives of the TIA was “to 
eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek 
injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state 
corporations asserting diversity jurisdiction.”172  This 
 
 167 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 168 See Leading Case: F. Tax Injunction Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 486, 491 (2004); see 
also 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 986 (2005) (“The two purposes of the TIA 
are: (1) to eliminate discrimination between state citizens who are required to pursue 
relief regarding illegal tax assessments in state court and foreign corporations operating 
in the state which could sue under diversity jurisdiction of federal courts; and (2) to 
prevent such foreign corporations from paralyzing state fiscal operations with dilatory 
and expensive legal actions in federal court.”) (footnote omitted). 
 169 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2003). 
 170 See High Court’s Decision Means New Alternative for Corporations, STATE INCOME 
TAX ALERT (CCH, Chicago, Ill.), July 15, 2004, at 2-3. 
 171 See id. 
 172 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2287 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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demonstrates that the Court was at the very least reckless in 
failing to account for the fact that foreign corporations are now 
able, as a result of Winn, to side-step state courts and to instead 
enjoy a more favorable federal forum. 
2.  The Majority Treats State Court Judges as Inferior 
Constitutional Arbiters 
As noted by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion, the 
Winn majority’s decision seems to rest on a presumption that 
state courts are incapable of properly adjudicating federal 
constitutional issues, and that these issues are better left to the 
federal courts.173  In the majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that when some of the states were using state tax credits as a 
means of circumventing Brown v. Board of Education,174 it was 
“[t]he federal courts, [the Supreme] Court among them, [that] 
adjudicated the ensuing challenges . . .  and upheld the 
Constitution’s equal protection requirement.”175  This 
presumptuous treatment of state courts is unfounded and 
dangerous to the fundamental principles of federalism on which 
our Constitution is based.176 
Treating state courts as “second rate constitutional arbiters,” 
according to Justice Kennedy, is completely unjustified in light of 
the fact that the TIA itself has a “federal safeguard:” the TIA 
allows for federal courts to take jurisdiction when the State court 
is unable “to provide ‘a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.’”177  
Furthermore, a litigant in a State court always has resort to the 
ultimate federal forum for review of the State court decision: the 
United States Supreme Court.178  Apparent from the majority’s 
decision is the majority’s fear that state courts are unable to 
correct violations of the federal Constitution, and that these 
violations can only be corrected when reviewed by a federal court.  
This fear, however, is unfounded and completely ignores 
constitutional jurisprudence established by Court precedent.  
Prior Court decisions have clearly established that state courts 
are not to be treated as inferior interpreters of the Constitution, 
and in the case a State court incorrectly interprets federal law, 
the Court is always available to correct any misinterpretations of 
 
 173 Id. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 174 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 175 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2281 (majority opinion). 
 176 See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“A doctrine 
based on the inherent inadequacy of state forums would run counter to basic principles of 
federalism.”). 
 177 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 178 Id. at 2297; see also Winn v. Killian, 321 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 2003) (arguing 
that “[s]tate judges take the same oath to uphold the federal Constitution that [federal 
judges] do, and like [federal judges] are subject to federal Supreme Court review”). 
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the federal law.179  Furthermore, by treating state courts as 
inferior constitutional interpreters, the majority has effectively 
disregarded Congress’ determination that federal courts are not 
the only available forums in which a litigant may present 
constitutional issues.180  The majority therefore erred in 
assuming that state courts are inadequate interpreters of the 
federal Constitution in relation to their federal court 
counterparts, since the majority ignored the fact that the state 
court litigant always has resort to the Court to review the State 
court decision. 
Finally, by treating state courts as inferior constitutional 
interpreters, the Winn majority ignored the fact that state court 
judges are required by the federal Constitution to uphold federal 
law.  In Arizona, State judges are required to take an oath before 
assuming office that requires them to “support the Constitution 
of the United States.”181  The Court itself has previously held 
that state courts are obliged to uphold the federal Constitution, 
and that state judges are entirely competent to adjudicate 
constitutional issues.182  When coupled with the fact that the 
Winn majority disregarded the availability of the Court as a 
federal forum for a state court litigant, the fact that the majority 
pays no credence to the constitutional requirement that state 
judges uphold the Constitution in performing their duties leaves 
us with the “unfortunate result [that state courts are deprived] of 
 
 179 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (establishing the authority for the 
judiciary to review the constitutionality of executive and legislative acts); Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 342 (1816) (holding that the Constitution presumes that the 
Supreme Court has the authority to review state court decisions in order to ensure 
uniformity in the interpretation of federal laws); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 414 
(1821) (holding that criminal defendants could seek Supreme Court review of their State 
court conviction when they claimed that their conviction violated the Constitution); 
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958) (holding that the Supreme Court has the 
authority to review state actions). 
 180 See California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 416-17 (1982) (“Carving 
out a special exception for taxpayers raising First Amendment claims would undermine 
significantly Congress’ primary purpose to limit drastically federal district court 
jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the collection of taxes.”) 
(internal quotations omitted); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19 
(1981) (“The [TIA] embodied Congress’ decision to transfer jurisdiction over a class of 
substantive federal claims from the federal district courts to the state courts, as long as 
state-court procedures were ‘plain, speedy and efficient’ and final review of the 
substantive federal claim could be obtained in [the] Court.”). 
 181 A.Z. CONST. art. 6, § 26 provides the following in regards to the oath an Arizona 
State judge must take prior to assuming office: “Each justice, judge and justice of the 
peace shall . . . take and subscribe an oath that he will support the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Arizona, and that he will faithfully and 
impartially discharge the duties of his office to the best of his ability.” (emphasis added). 
 182 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (“The States and their officers 
are bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal statutes that 
comport with the constitutional design.  [The Court is] unwilling to assume the States will 
refuse to honor the Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States.”). 
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the first opportunity to hear [state tax] cases and to grant the 
relief the Constitution requires.”183 
3.  Principles of Comity Preclude Federal Interference with 
State Tax Systems 
Although the Winn majority found it proper to look past the 
seemingly clear and unambiguous statutory language of the TIA 
in holding that the TIA does not apply to a federal challenge to a 
state tax credit, federal courts are still bound by the comity 
doctrine,184 which requires federal courts to defer to state courts 
when a fundamental state interest is being challenged.185  As 
noted by Justice Kennedy in his dissenting opinion, a federal 
court order affecting a state tax credit in any manner “will 
thwart and replace the State’s chosen tax policy,” which is 
precisely what the judicial principle of comity is meant to 
prohibit.186 
A federal court order declaring the Arizona STO tax credit 
unconstitutional and therefore invalid is inherently disruptive to 
a State’s tax system, since it will prevent the State from making 
a final determination of its taxpayer’s tax bills.187  Arizona’s 
decision to offer the A.R.S. § 1089 tax credit to its taxpayers is 
purely an Arizona State interest, and as such, it should be 
afforded the respect and deference mandated by the judicial 
comity doctrine, since “[i]t is a troubling proposition for [the] 
Court to proceed on the assumption that the State’s interest in 
limiting the tax burden on its citizens to that for which its law 
provides is a secondary policy, deserving of little respect from 
[the Court].”188  In California v. Grace Brethren Church, the 
Court noted that states have a legitimate interest in 
administering their respective tax systems, and “if federal 
declaratory relief were available to test state tax assessments, 
 
 183 Hibbs v. Winn, 124 S. Ct. 2276, 2301 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 184 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 110 (2d pocket ed., West 2001) (defining “comity” as 
“[c]ourtesy among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different jurisdictions), 
involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts”; and defining 
“judicial comity” as “[t]he respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to another 
state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws and judicial decisions”) (emphasis 
added). 
 185 See Leading Case: F. Tax Injunction Act, supra note 168, at 495, 496 n.80 
(discussing how the principle of comity stems from the abstention doctrine found in 
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), which prevents federal courts from interfering with 
a state case in which there exists an adequate state court remedy, and when it would be 
proper to abstain from taking jurisdiction when a respect for state functions demands it). 
 186 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle 
Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 522 (1981) (noting that the principal purpose of the TIA is “to 
limit drastically federal court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as 
the collection of taxes”). 
 187 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 18, at 28. 
 188 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300. 
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state tax administration might be thrown into disarray.”189 
Furthermore, the TIA is meant to ensure that state courts 
are granted the exclusive authority to interpret state law, and in 
turn, to ensure that the State is accountable to its citizens for its 
policies and decisions.190  A federal court order either 
invalidating or upholding a state tax law has the unfortunate 
effect of a lack of political accountability—distraught citizens are 
unable to hold state officials accountable because the challenge 
was adjudicated in federal court, and federal judges are 
appointed officials who are not subject to the political election 
process as are state judges.  As previously noted by the Court, 
even if a state tax law has federal constitutional implications, as 
does the Arizona STO tax credit, “federal constitutional issues 
are likely to turn on questions of state tax law, which, like issues 
of state regulatory law, are more properly heard in the state 
courts.”191  In the distinct interest of maintaining longstanding 
principles of judicial comity among the federal and state courts, 
the Winn Court erred in allowing the challenge to the Arizona 
STO tax credit to proceed in federal court, since principles of 
comity demand federal courts to refrain from interfering in so 
delicate and vital an interest as a State’s tax system.  As noted 
by Justice Kennedy, “the majority’s ruling has implications far 
beyond this case and will most certainly result in federal courts 
in other States and in other cases being required to interpret 
state tax law in order to complete their review of challenges to 
state tax statutes.”192 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Whether the Winn Court has opened Pandora’s Box in terms 
of federal court intrusion into state tax systems has yet to be 
determined, and the true ramifications of the Court’s decision are 
speculative at the present moment.  However, what remains true 
and apparent is that the Winn majority disregarded the plain 
language of a seemingly clear, concise, and unambiguous federal 
statute and stretched the congressional intent of the TIA to 
illogical levels.  By accepting the Ninth Circuit’s definition of 
“assessment,” the Court has essentially approved of federal 
courts that pick and choose among relevant definitions of a 
statutory term in order to use those definitions necessary to 
 
 189 California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 410 (1982) (quoting Perez v. 
Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 128 n.17 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)). 
 190 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2299 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 191 Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. at 410 (quoting Perez, 401 U.S. at 128 n.17 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 192 Winn, 124 S. Ct. at 2300 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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achieve a desired statutory interpretation. 
The Winn decision has struck a vital blow to the principles of 
federalism on which our constitutional jurisprudence and 
maintenance of state sovereignty are based since federal courts 
are now granted jurisdiction in a realm previously off-limits to 
these courts: state tax systems.  State court judges, in the eyes of 
the Winn Court, are merely second-rate constitutional 
interpreters who are not as fit for interpreting delicate 
constitutional issues as are their federal court counterparts.  
This result is especially troubling in light of the fact that state 
courts are traditionally known as courts of general jurisdiction, 
fully competent to litigate any constitutional issue so long as the 
issue does not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. 
As a result of Winn, with some clever pleading, a taxpayer or 
taxpaying entity seeking to challenge a State tax law is able to 
sidestep the State court for the more favorable federal forum, so 
long as the challenge does not inhibit the State’s ability to collect 
revenue.  As this Note has attempted to demonstrate, Congress 
was not exclusively concerned with protecting a State’s ability to 
collect revenue in enacting the TIA, but instead intended to 
exclude federal courts from interfering with the State’s entire tax 
system in any way so long as the State court provides an 
adequate remedy to the litigant.  The Winn Court failed to 
acknowledge the clear intent of Congress in enacting the TIA, 
thus opening the door for federal court intervention in a 
traditionally restricted state area. 
Hopefully, in light of this troubling decision, Congress, or the 
Court itself, will act quickly to remedy this wrong in order to 
maintain fundamental principles of federalism and state 
sovereignty in the administration of state tax systems.  The 
integrity of our federal judicial system and the maintenance of 
our States as sovereign entities demand no less. 
 
